# Relevant 1AR

## Water Wars

### at: empirics

#### Thousands of years of data prove

Glecik 5/29/9

<http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/the_truth_about_water_wars/> Peter Gleick is co-founder and president of the Pacific Institute in Oakland, California, and a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Water Security and the UN’s Expert Group on Policy Relevance of the World Water Assessment Program. He is editor of the biennial book The World’s Water and has recently begun blogging at Water By the Numbers.

Far more important, and far easier to answer, is the question: Is there any connection between fresh water and conflict, including violent conflict? And the answer has to be an unambiguous “yes.” History going back 5,000 years is rife with examples where water has been a goal of violence, a target or tool of conflict, or a source of disputes and political strife. Our Water Conflict Chronology, at worldwater.org, lists hundreds of these examples. And if there is a strong connection between water and conflicts, two new questions come up: Are the risks of these conflicts growing, and how can we reduce them? I think the answer to the first is, yes, the risks of water-related conflicts appears to be growing.

### at: diplomacy

#### Only our authors account for upstream-downstream relations

Pearce 5/14/9

<http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/the_truth_about_water_wars/>

Fred Pearce is an environmental journalist and author of numerous books, including When the River Runs Dry: Water—The Defining Crisis of the 21st Century.

Water, unlike land, is hard to “capture.” It flows. As Barnaby points out, countries have a lot of reasons for cooperating over water that flows between nations. And many do. She’s also right in acknowledging the importance of trade in thirsty products like food—often termed “virtual water.” There would have been many more wars in the Middle East in the past 30 years but for this trade, which keeps Egypt, Jordan, and others fed. But that approach will not always work. There are serious potential conflicts around the world where upstream countries can withhold water from arid downstream countries that need or want it. India and Pakistan constantly bicker over the Indus. How long will a fully functioning Iraqi state settle for Turkey controlling the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates with large dams? Meanwhile Egypt’s insistence on its prior right to the majority of the flow of the Nile is an unresolved tension afflicting a quarter of a continent. If wars arise over grievances, then water is a common source of grievances between nations. Israeli and Palestinian technocrats may cooperate over day-to-day water management, but that does not stop an absolute ban, imposed by Israel, on West Bank Palestinians sinking new wells to tap water beneath their feet. Water is a major grievance there. And as water shortages become more intense in much of the world over the coming decades, the potential for conflicts will grow. It is dangerous to “blame” a resource like water for wars. It can too easily become an excuse for failing to resolve conflicts. To “blame” water for genocide in Sudan is obscene. But to go to the other extreme and deny water as a potential factor in wars is equally foolish. Yes, management of water can become a meeting point for nations as well as a source of conflict. But many rivers and other sources of water that cross international boundaries are today not subject to treaties for sharing. That is dangerous. If we are to avoid water wars, there is an urgent need for more water diplomacy.

## Politics

### Thump

**Sequester**

**Sequester trigger drains capital**

**Klein 2-5**

Philip is a columnist for the Washington Examiner, “Obama Blinks on the Sequester, GOP Finally has Upper Hand,” <http://washingtonexaminer.com/obama-blinks-on-the-sequester-gop-finally-has-upper-hand/article/2520598>

Now **Republicans have turned the tables on Obama**. If nothing happens by March 1, **about $1 trillion worth of spending cuts will go into effect automatically**. Ideally, Republicans don’t want the military spending cuts, and they have voted in the House to replace them with other cuts. But they can live with them if nothing happens. Coming off the fourth quarter in which the economy contracted by 0.1 percent and was hurt by defense cuts**, Obama doesn’t want to have headlines of defense contractor layoffs** **eroding his political capital in the short window he has to advance his second term agenda**.

**Guns**

**Obama pushing guns**

**Walsh 2-5**

Joan is a Columnist for Slate, “Obama’s Gutsy Gun Control Push,” <http://www.salon.com/2013/02/05/obamas_gutsy_gun_control_push/>

Second-term Barack **Obama continues to show us he’s** wiser and **tougher** than the guy who took office four years ago. **The latest sign is his stance on his gun control agenda**. In Minneapolis on Monday, **he laid out everything he intends to push for**, not merely pushing criminal background checks and tougher penalties for gun trafficking, but also **the part of his plan that will be the heaviest lifting: an assault weapons ban.**¶ **This is what many liberals have hoped to see** since his earliest political battles in 2009, going all the way back to the initial stimulus skirmishes: a **president who tells the American people what he think**s will solve our problems, **and who fights for those solutions, who demands congressional votes even on the most controversial agenda items** – and who may, down the road, be forced to compromise on some of those priorities, only to fight for them another day.

**Drones**

**Drones thumps**

**Todd et al 2-5**

Chuck is an NBC News’ Chief Political Correspondent, “Flooding the Zone,” <http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/05/16852487-first-thoughts-flooding-the-zone>

\*\*\* On drones and executive power: As [NBC’s Michael Isikoff first reported last night](http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-exclusive-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-americans?lite), **a confidential Justice Department memo “concludes that the U.S. government can order the killing of American citizens** if they are believed to be ‘senior operational leaders’ of al-Qaida or ‘an associated force’ -- even if there is no intelligence indicating they are engaged in an active plot to attack the U.S.” Isikoff adds, “The [16-page memo](http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf), a copy of which was obtained by NBC News, provides new details about the legal reasoning behind one of the Obama administration’s most secretive and controversial polices: its dramatically increased use of drone strikes against al-Qaida suspects, including those aimed at American citizens, such as the September 2011 strike in Yemen that killed alleged al-Qaida operatives Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan.” The publication of this memo will likely: 1) add fireworks to John Brennan’s confirmation hearing on Thursday to head the CIA, and 2) spark a public debate about this issue. There hasn’t been much of an outcry about this beyond the civil-liberties community, because the public wants to go after bad guys (like al-Awlaki). But the story does raise important questions: What are the checks on this power? How much faith do you put in executive branch in not abusing this? Expect these questions to come up at Brennan’s confirmation hearing. Congress has been surprisingly silent on this issue, very few members have demanded more transparency or oversight. **Perhaps this memo will spark more Congressional interest.**

**Brenan**

**Brenan nomination drains capital**

**National Journal 2-6**

“What’s at Stake in John Brenan’s Hearing to Lead the CIA,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/what-s-at-stake-in-john-brennan-s-hearing-to-lead-the-cia-20130206>

Call it Chuck Hagel Part II.¶ John **Brennan**, President Obama's pick to head the CIA, faces a frustrated Senate Intelligence Committee on Thursday, where he **will be grilled on** the Obama administration's increased use of **drones and the harsh interrogations** that took place **during the Bush administration.** Brennan was a top aide to former CIA director George Tenet during the time just after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks when harsh interrogation techniques, such as waterboarding, were being used. He has since said he opposed the program.¶ The White House has signaled confidence that Brennan’s nomination will get Senate approval, despite concerns over civilian casualties from the drone attacks and the targeting of some Americans. On Wednesday, White House press secretary Jay Carney said the president is working to create a legal architecture for the drone program and to create further transparency.¶ The hearing could shed further light drone attacks, which have been carried out from Yemen to Pakistan but are rarely discussed publicly by administration officials. **If Brennan's hearing goes as well as Hagel's, the president would face two top nominees at risk of upending his early second-term agenda.¶**

**Generic**

**Obama strategy tanks the agenda**

**Stirewalt 2-6**

Chris is the digital politics editor at Fox News, “Senate Dems may Sink Obama’s Second Term Strategy,” <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/02/06/senate-dems-may-sink-obamas-second-term-strategy/>

In the first half of his first term, President Obama could count on then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to shove her members into politically damaging votes in order to advance his agenda.¶ Whether it was a new government-run insurance program or global warming fees, Pelosi was willing to walk into the fire for Obama. While those initiatives failed, they gave Obama leverage in getting something out of balky moderate Democrats in the Senate.¶ There would be no Obama health-insurance entitlement program had Pelosi not kept the heat on Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. The results for Pelosi’s members, though, were disastrous.¶ Republicans were able to use Obama’s unpopular health law in almost every district, and could augment those attacks with carbon fees and other votes with regional specificity. And when that wasn’t enough, they could use the unpopular Pelosi herself as a cudgel. This set up a Midterm wipeout just ahead of 2010 redistricting and a huge GOP majority with serious staying power.¶ Now, the president’s ambitious second-term agenda hangs on convincing Senate Democrats to take similar risks on his behalf.¶ **Obama today heads to the Senate Democratic retreat** in Annapolis and **brings with him a bulging binder of demands:**¶ The president is seeking **a gun ban, same-sex marriage**, another round of **tax increases, the continued power to kill American citizens without trial** for ties to militant Islamists, **the confirmation of a Defense secretary** who stammered and staggered his way through confirmation hearings, **more stimulus** spending, a speedy and broad **amnesty** for illegal immigrants, ratification **of a global warming treaty and more, more, more**.¶ Obama’s strategy is to get what he can out of his list and in everything else keep House Republicans on defense. By applying pressure on House Republicans through community organizing precepts**, Obama believes that he can “break the fever**” of conservative opposition and remake the Republican Party into something more amenable to his aims.¶ Liberals and establishment press outlets have cheered on the president’s confrontational “go for the throat” strategy. They relish the fight and also hold conservatives in low esteem, not understanding the ideology, and so assume that Republican opposition to Obama is, as he says, cynical and unpatriotic.¶ **This sounds like a good strategy, but for the United States Senate.¶** Obama seems to not have figured out how the Senate works during his four years there. This collection of the 100 largest egos in the known universe is not like the 435 squabbling biennially elected members of the House. Senators don’t like to be shoved and they are much harder to threaten or pressure.¶ Reid is fairly typical. Obama is the fifth president under whom he has served and likely has thoughts of serving under a sixth. He has figured out a political strategy that works in purple Nevada: a mix of social conservatism, pork power, union support, Mormonism and political patronage.¶ By applying pressure on House Republicans through community organizing precepts, Obama believes that he can “break the fever” of conservative opposition and remake the Republican Party into something more amenable to his aims.¶ While Senate Democrats may delight in the thought of Obama’s offer -- total victory over Republicans -- most of them have served long enough to know that the political pendulum is always swinging, sometimes with surprising speed.¶ When Obama asks Democrats to take dangerous votes he is asking lawmakers like **Reid** to undo the delicate balances they have found in their home states.¶ There is another problem for Reid. **He’s got 12 incumbents running in potentially competitive races, including five in states won by Mitt Romney last year. All 12 are eager to show themselves to be moderate** and independent and for the five Red staters, as much distance from Obama as decorum allows.¶ When Obama asks them to take politically risky stances, especially on social issues, he is telling them that if they keep the pressure on Republicans and set up victories in 2014, rather than just limiting expected Midterm losses.¶ But these senators are already busy trying to raise money and prevent primary challenges. For them, the 2014 cycle began on November 7. When Obama talks about using most of the next two years dividing and conquering Republicans and then pivoting to elections, he is too late.¶ And this reflects Obama’s status as a lame duck in waiting. Senators like to be flattered and like to have their picture taken with the president and hobnob at state dinners, but they also know that Obama’s political utility to them is fleeting.¶ A third of them already know they will be there after Obama is gone and most of the other two thirds have every intention of outlasting the Obama era in Washington.¶ Obama’s strategy for avoiding lame-duck status is for the Senate to act out of character: with speed and without first protecting the political prospects of its members. **The president found unwilling partners in the Senate when he was at the peak of power four years ago. It seems doubtful that he will do better now.¶**

**2NC- Ext. No War**

**Prefer our studies – others are not empirical, lack coherent definitions, and don’t specify duration of growth**

**Boehmer 10**

(Charles, professor of political science at the University of Texas – El Paso and Ph.D. in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University, “Economic Growth and Violent International Conflict: 1875-1999,” Defence and Peace Economics, June, Vol. 21, Issue 3, pg. 249-268)

The literature cited above is quite diverse concerning units of analysis, theories, research methods, and data. One study such as this cannot re-examine all the potential hypotheses therein. However, **this paper offers some general critiques** across the literature. First, **most of the studies** at the systemic level of analysis **are** either **difficult to substantiate empirically**, such as providing evidence that long cycles are actually 'cycles' endogenous to the global economy and not simply statistical random walks (Beck, 1991), **or** are **theoretically imprecise** concerning mechanisms and processes. Some work in this area lacks agency, linking periodicities of economic cycles to individual states. Second, most of the studies that focus on foreign policy moods lack a well-developed of 'mood'. How could we best identify such a variable and does it extend equally to leaders and those in society? Third, **most of these studies** from both perspectives **are unspecific about the duration of growth** and its effects on conflict. Shorter-term conception growth rates are often undifferentiated from longer-term economic development. Some studies simply use one-year lags of economic growth while others measure growth over several years using moving averages, whereas others focus on long waves or cycles of more than a decade. There are important theoretical distinctions in such choices.

**Consensus of experts concur – no war.**

**Jaroslav 10**

(Tir Jaroslav, Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia. The Journal of Politics, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425, Hopkins)

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.[14](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#fn14) The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job ([1986](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref68)), for example, note that the likelihood **that a** U.S. **President will use force is uncertain**, as **the bad economy might** **create incentives** both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to **focus on** solving **the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad**. Similarly, **Fordham** ([1998a](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref22), [1998b](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref23)), **DeRouen** ([1995](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref17)), **and Gowa** ([1998](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref34)) **find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of** **force**. Furthermore, **Leeds and Davis** ([1997](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref50)) **conclude that** the **conflict-initiating behavior** of 18 industrialized democracies **is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani** ([2005](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref69)) **and Russett and Oneal** ([2001](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref73)) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides ([1995](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref38)), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s ([2002](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref24)) revision of Gowa’s ([1998](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref34)) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake ([2002](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref19)) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett ([1997](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref66)) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett ([1990](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref72))—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering ([2007](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref49)) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski ([2008](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#ref84)) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.[15](http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=6&fid=7418116&jid=JOP&volumeId=72&issueId=02&aid=7418112&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022381609990879#fn15) Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled **leaders are much more likely to respond with** territorial **diversions** **to** direct **signs of their unpopularity** (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) **than to** general background conditions such as **economic malaise**. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

**Their historical examples are flawed- US dominance means no war**

**Ferguson ‘9**

(Niall Ferguson, Prof. History @ Harvard, <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20090223.wferguson0223/BNStory/crashandrecovery/home/?pageRequested=all>)

It's just that **I don't see it producing anything comparable with 1914 or 1939.** **It's** kind of **hard to envisage a** **world war.** Even when most pessimistic, I struggle to see how that would work, **because the U.S.,** for all its difficulties in the financial world, **is so overwhelmingly dominant in the military world**.